

9. Coproduced collective security and the resiliency of modus vivendi pluralism

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1. INTRODUCTION

The concept of modus vivendi pluralism (McCabe 2014; Gray 2002; Neal 1993), emphasizes pragmatic coexistence and compromise among diverse communities, offering a framework for managing tensions that arise from differing cultural, religious, economic, and political norms. As global interactions become more frequent due to technology and migration, society has a need for political systems that can both maintain peace and stability without imposing uniformity across increasingly diverse populations. Modus vivendi pluralism provides a pathway for these diverse value systems to coexist because it prioritizes stability and mutual accommodation over consensus. In doing so, it acknowledges the reality of deep-seated differences while promoting a form of governance that avoids the pitfalls of enforced homogenization.

However, critics argue that the fragmented nature of modus vivendi systems makes them vulnerable to shocks, raising concerns about their long-term viability. The inherent flexibility that allows modus vivendi systems to accommodate diverse values may also render them susceptible to destabilization in times of crisis. This tension between flexibility and resilience poses a dilemma: while modus vivendi pluralism offers a promising approach to managing diversity, its endurance in the face of exogenous shocks is questionable. Their endurance may depend on their capacity to develop mechanisms for reinforcing stability without sacrificing the pluralism that is the basis of their legitimacy.

This chapter begins by exploring the challenges of resilience in systems built in a modus vivendi fashion. We pay particular attention to potential weaknesses of these systems. For example, how the absence of centralized authority may exacerbate coordination problems, create inefficiencies, and weaken collective responses during crises. Systems that can accommodate elements of modus vivendi governance are typically decentralized (Aligica 2019). This

is because distinct groups within a territory require some degree of autonomy within their own sphere.

In decentralized political systems, the lack of a unified command structure often leads to difficulties in organizing and executing a coherent response to threats. These coordination challenges can hinder the ability of such systems to maintain stability, especially in the face of external pressures or internal conflicts.

The chapter delves into these challenges, highlighting the balance that must be struck between maintaining pluralism and ensuring effective governance. It examines systems such as the Congress System in post-Napoleonic Europe and the National Pact in Lebanon to illustrate how the lack of central control can undermine the durability of *modus vivendi* arrangements.

The chapter then shifts to an economic analysis of inter-jurisdictional conflict, investigating how different jurisdictions within a *modus vivendi* framework can allocate resources between productive tasks and military capacity. By applying economic principles to the study of these dynamics, the chapter addresses the underlying incentives and behaviors that influence the stability and adaptability of *modus vivendi* arrangements. Jurisdictions within such systems must constantly navigate the trade-offs between investing in public goods and bolstering their defensive capabilities. This economic perspective helps to explain why some systems based on *modus vivendi* principles succeed in maintaining peace and stability, while others are prone to collapse under the weight of external threats or internal discord.

In response to the resilience challenges identified, the chapter discusses polycentric defense arrangements as a potential solution for enhancing the durability of *modus vivendi* systems. By distributing military capacity across multiple decision centers, polycentric systems can reduce the likelihood of rent-seeking behavior, which often plagues centralized defense structures, and improve the system's ability to adapt to environmental shocks. The chapter presents examples such as Switzerland's cantonal system, which allows for localized decision-making in defense matters, and the decentralized response to Hurricane Katrina in the United States, where multiple levels of government and civil society played crucial roles. These cases demonstrate how polycentric defense arrangements can bolster the resilience of *modus vivendi* systems, particularly when state institutions effectively coordinate these autonomous military centers to ensure a cohesive and robust defense strategy.

Finally, the chapter illustrates the value of viewing collective security as a coproducted service within *modus vivendi* arrangements, rather than a public good provided solely by a centralized state. It discusses how collective security can be achieved through collaboration among state institutions, local communities, private enterprises, and non-governmental organization (Alshamy et al.

2024). The coproduction model of security leverages the strengths of decentralized decision-making while promoting unified action when necessary.

The chapter concludes with an empirical illustration of Ukraine's collective security strategy against Russia, which integrates state and local resources within the hromada system, as a contemporary example of how coproduced defense arrangements can enhance resilience in national defense.

This paper highlights that the allocation of resources between military capacity and productive tasks not only reflects the strategic priorities of individual jurisdictions but also shapes their ability to collaborate effectively with one another. The economic lens here provides a valuable framework for understanding the trade-offs and incentives that drive both cooperation and conflict within decentralized systems.

The economic perspective underscores the importance of fostering coordination mechanisms that can support collective security without undermining the autonomy that is central to these systems. While this chapter primarily focuses on the dynamics of violent physical conflict and the corresponding investments in military capacity, the analytical framework presented here can be extended to other forms of conflict, including social, political, and digital domains. Just as jurisdictions allocate resources between productive tasks and military defense, they also make strategic decisions about how to manage and mitigate non-physical conflicts that can threaten the stability and cohesion of *modus vivendi* approaches. These conflicts may involve social tensions, political disputes, or cyber threats, all of which require a careful balancing of resources to ensure that resilience is maintained across multiple dimensions of governance.

2. THE CHALLENGE OF RESILIENCE IN *MODUS VIVENDI* PLURALISM

Modus vivendi pluralism is grounded in the idea that diverse value systems can coexist peacefully through pragmatic agreements and mutual accommodations (Horton 2010; Rossi 2010). It contrasts with more homogenizing approaches that seek to impose a single set of values or norms across different communities. The increasing diversity of value systems globally—shaped by cultural, religious, economic, and political differences—has made *modus vivendi* approaches to pluralism an attractive framework for maintaining peace and stability (Aligica 2018).

The resilience of these systems is unclear. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to withstand and recover from environmental shocks, such as economic crises, natural disasters, or political upheavals, while maintaining its core institutions and norms. Critics argue that the fragmented nature of such systems makes them vulnerable to such shocks, as the lack of centralized

authority could lead to coordination problems, inefficiencies, and a weakened collective response (Mason, 2018).

For example, during a natural disaster affecting multiple jurisdictions within a pluralistic system, the absence of a unified command structure may result in delays or inconsistencies in disaster response efforts (Storr, Grube, and Haeffele-Balch 2017). Coordination challenges can arise in resource allocation, information sharing, and logistical support, potentially prolonging recovery times and exacerbating the impact of the disaster on affected communities (Ostrom, 1999).

The Congress System, established after the Napoleonic Wars, serves as a prominent example of a *modus vivendi* arrangement whose resiliency was compromised by inadequate central coordination (Schroeder, 1994). Conceived to maintain peace and balance of power in Europe, the system relied heavily on ad-hoc meetings among the Great Powers without a centralized authority to enforce decisions or manage conflicts effectively. The inability to address emerging challenges, such as the revolutions in Spain and Italy, exposed the system's fragility. By 1822, the system collapsed. This demonstrated that the absence of a cohesive coordinating mechanism can undermine the durability of such arrangements.

Similarly, the national pact adopted in Lebanon in 1943 exemplifies the vulnerabilities of *modus vivendi* systems when central coordination is lacking. This unwritten agreement between Lebanon's Christian and Muslim communities was designed to share power and prevent sectarian conflict. While it initially maintained a delicate balance, the pact's effectiveness eroded over time due to the absence of a central authority capable of managing political changes and external pressures (Bahout 2016). By the 1970s, rising tensions and inadequate coordination led to the collapse of this arrangement, ultimately resulting in the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990). This case highlights the critical role of central coordination in sustaining the resilience of *modus vivendi* systems in the face of evolving challenges (Rabinovich 1989).

Efficiency concerns also arise in decentralized systems where resources are allocated independently by local decision-makers. In the context of national defense and security, for instance, decentralized militaries may prioritize local interests over broader national security priorities. Moreover, without centralized oversight or coordination mechanisms, there is a risk of duplication of efforts and inefficiencies in resource allocation. Local decision-makers may lack the strategic perspective or comprehensive data needed to make informed decisions that optimize overall system resilience and effectiveness (Olson, 1993).

The Hanseatic League, a commercial and defensive confederation of merchant guilds and market towns in Northwestern and Central Europe from the 12th to the seventeenth century, is an illustrative case of a *modus vivendi*

arrangement compromised by misaligned incentives. Despite its goal to promote mutual economic interests among member cities, the League's lack of centralized control led to conflicting priorities. Individual cities often pursued their own economic agendas, undermining the collective goals of the League. As cities increasingly prioritized local benefits over the broader interests of the confederation, the League's operational efficiency deteriorated, contributing to its eventual decline (Dollinger, 1999).

Similarly, the United States under the Articles of Confederation (1781–1789) provides a clear example of how the absence of central control can lead to duplication of effort, severely compromising the efficiency of a *modus vivendi* arrangement. The Articles created a weak central government, unable to enforce national policies or effectively coordinate state actions. As a result, individual states maintained their own militias, currencies, and trade policies, leading to inefficient and redundant efforts. For instance, competing trade agreements by different states weakened the nation's overall economic position. These inefficiencies were a major factor in the decision to replace the Articles of Confederation with the US Constitution in 1789 (Jensen, 1940).

Finally, a fragmented governance structure can weaken the collective response capabilities of *modus vivendi* systems during crises that require unified action. In scenarios involving transnational threats such as terrorism or pandemic outbreaks, cohesive international cooperation and unified policy responses are essential (Keohane & Nye, 2000). Decentralized systems may struggle to achieve consensus or act swiftly in such situations, potentially leaving vulnerabilities exposed and compromising overall security and stability (Hardin, 1982).

The Holy Roman Empire (962–1806) serves as an example of a *modus vivendi* arrangement whose resilience was compromised by the absence of central control, leading to a weakened collective response. Composed of a vast array of semi-autonomous principalities, free cities, and kingdoms, the Empire was held together by a loose structure with the emperor exerting limited authority over the constituent territories. This fragmentation meant that the Empire struggled to present a unified front, especially during critical periods such as the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). The competing interests and lack of centralized coordination among the various entities within the Empire undermined its ability to respond effectively to both internal and external threats. Over time, this weakened collective response contributed to the Empire's gradual decline and eventual dissolution in 1806, demonstrating how the absence of robust central control can erode the resilience of a *modus vivendi* system (Whaley, 2012).

The examples discussed illustrate the vulnerabilities inherent in *modus vivendi* systems, particularly when central control is absent or weak. Whether through misaligned incentives, duplication of effort, or weakened collective

responses, the lack of centralized authority can lead to inefficiencies, conflicts, and ultimately, the collapse of these systems. The fragmented nature of *modus vivendi* arrangements often exacerbates these challenges. While *modus vivendi* pluralism offers a promising framework for managing diversity and maintaining peace, its resilience depends on the ability to balance local autonomy with effective coordination and unified responses to common threats.

3. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTER-JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT

To better understand how arrangements that resemble *modus vivendi* approaches can attain resiliency despite their decentralized nature, it is useful to first cast the issue of inter-jurisdictional conflict within an economic lens. By viewing decisions related to military capacity and conflict as economic choices, we can analyze how jurisdictions allocate resources between productive tasks and defense. This economic perspective helps elucidate the incentives and behaviors that influence the stability and adaptability of these arrangements. Furthermore, examining these dynamics through an economic framework highlights the role of coordination mechanisms and institutional arrangements in mitigating risks and ensuring effective responses to disruptions.

More broadly, the field of conflict economics examines the economic causes, dynamics, and consequences of conflict, both within and between states. It integrates insights from economics, political science, and sociology to analyze how resource competition, political power struggles, and strategic interactions drive conflicts. Scholars in this field study various forms of conflict, including civil wars, interstate wars, and insurgencies, with a focus on understanding how economic factors influence conflict initiation, duration, and resolution (Garfinkel & Skaperdas, 2012). The study of conflict economics explores the role of institutions and governance in mitigating or exacerbating conflicts, emphasizing the importance of economic policies and structural conditions in fostering peace and stability (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).

In any system, resources must be allocated between various productive tasks and military capacity. Productive tasks include activities that contribute to economic growth and social welfare, such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure development. Military capacity, on the other hand, involves the allocation of resources towards defense and security measures. The spending choices of a jurisdiction along these two directions will shape how they are able to cooperate with other separate jurisdictions that are concurrently making similar investment choices.

Jurisdictions invest in military capacity to ensure collective security and deter potential aggressors, protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity

(Mearsheimer, 2001; Schelling, 1966). A robust military safeguards strategic interests such as economic resources and trade routes (Art, 2003) and plays a critical role in peacekeeping and stabilization missions, maintaining order and supporting humanitarian efforts (Diehl, 2008). Military forces are essential during natural disasters and emergencies, providing logistical support and manpower for effective relief efforts (Perry & Neal, 2007). Investment in military capacity also drives technological innovation, with advancements in fields like aerospace and communications benefiting the broader economy (Alic et al., 1992). Additionally, a strong military enhances political influence on the global stage and strengthens international alliances (Walt, 1987), while also helping maintain internal security and stability (Posen, 1984).

When jurisdictions, however, allocate excessive resources to military capacity at the expense of productive tasks, it can lead to rent-seeking behaviors, where resources are diverted from beneficial uses to sustain and expand military dominance (Olson, 1993). This dynamic can create vulnerabilities within the system, as the focus on military expansion undermines economic stability and social welfare, making the system more susceptible to environmental shocks. This dynamic creates vulnerabilities within the system, as the focus on military expansion undermines economic stability and social welfare, making the system more susceptible to environmental shocks (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).

An imbalance of military power across allied jurisdictions can also undermine the growth of productive relationships between them. When one ally possesses disproportionately superior military capabilities compared to others within the alliance, it can create dynamics of dependency, distrust, and imbalance in decision-making processes (Walt, 1987). The dominant ally may exert undue influence or dictate terms that prioritize its own security concerns over collective interests. This imbalance can lead to resentment and friction among allies, eroding mutual trust and cooperation essential for fostering productive relationships (Mearsheimer, 2001). Moreover, weaker allies may feel compelled to allocate more resources to military buildup, diverting funds from economic development and other collaborative efforts. This diversion not only strains their economies but also diminishes their capacity to contribute meaningfully to shared goals such as trade partnerships, infrastructure projects, or diplomatic initiatives. An imbalance in military power can distort the alliance's unity and effectiveness, hindering the potential for mutually beneficial cooperation and undermining broader efforts towards regional or global stability.

Analyzing inter-jurisdictional conflict through an economic lens offers insights into the dynamics of resource allocation and its impact on the resilience of a system. By viewing military and productive investments as competing choices, we better understand how jurisdictions balance their strategies to

ensure both security and development. Excessive focus on military capacity can destabilize economic stability and social welfare, leading to vulnerabilities that can undermine collective resilience. Likewise, imbalances in military power within alliances can erode trust and cooperation, affecting the efficacy of collective efforts. Ultimately, this economic perspective suggests the importance of balanced resource allocation in fostering adaptable systems capable of navigating the challenges of inter-jurisdictional conflict.

4. POLYCENTRIC DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS

Polycentric systems inherently promote local autonomy and accountability, creating an environment where decision-makers are closely attuned to the needs and preferences of their immediate constituencies (Aligica and Tarko, 2012). This approach is rooted in the work of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, who argued that multiple centers of decision-making within a governance framework could foster more effective and adaptable solutions to collective action problems. Vincent Ostrom emphasized that polycentric governance allows for a diverse array of decision-making units to operate semi-independently while still coordinating within a broader system, thereby preventing the concentration of power and enabling more context-specific responses to local needs (V. Ostrom 1973; 1999a). Elinor Ostrom expanded on this concept through her empirical research, demonstrating that polycentric governance structures often outperform centralized systems by utilizing local knowledge and fostering collaboration among various stakeholders to sustainably manage common-pool resources (E. Ostrom 1990).

This alignment between governance and local conditions is particularly advantageous in dynamic and diverse settings, where challenges and opportunities can vary significantly across regions. By empowering local decision centers, polycentric systems enable a more responsive and adaptive governance model, as these centers are better equipped to identify and address specific issues in their jurisdictions. For example, decentralized governance allows local actors to respond swiftly to environmental shocks, mobilizing resources and implementing tailored solutions that reflect the unique characteristics and needs of their communities (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001). This localized focus not only enhances the effectiveness of governance but also fosters a sense of ownership and responsibility among local actors, who are directly accountable to their communities. Such responsiveness is critical for ensuring that the broader system remains stable and resilient, particularly in the face of unforeseen challenges.

In the context of defense, polycentric arrangements—where military capacity is distributed across multiple decision centers—present a solution to the challenges of resilience in *modus vivendi* systems (V. Ostrom 1999b). By

decentralizing military power, these arrangements reduce the concentration of authority and the associated risks of rent-seeking behavior, where resources might otherwise be diverted from productive tasks to sustain or expand military dominance (Benson, 2006). This decentralization not only discourages the misuse of resources but also strengthens the overall resilience of the system by maintaining a balance between defense needs and other critical societal functions. In polycentric defense systems, the distribution of military resources across various centers can allow for a more diversified and flexible approach to security, enabling a coordinated yet adaptable response to threats.

A relevant example of a polycentric defense arrangement is Switzerland's cantonal system, where defense responsibilities are distributed across the country's 26 cantons. Each canton manages its own civil defense infrastructure, which is coordinated with the federal government to ensure a unified response during crises (Dardanelli and Mueller 2019). This decentralized approach allows cantons to develop defense strategies suited to their specific regional needs and conditions. For example, during a natural disaster, cantonal authorities can quickly mobilize local resources and implement region-specific response plans, leveraging their knowledge of local circumstances (Kriesi & Trechsel, 2008).

State institutions and organizations still play a crucial role in coordinating autonomous military centers in polycentric defense arrangements (Weber, 1922). Effective coordination is essential to ensuring a cohesive response to system disruptions and preventing fragmented efforts that could undermine overall security (Kahler & Lake, 2003). State institutions can facilitate communication, resource sharing, and strategic planning among the various decision centers, thereby enhancing the collective capacity to address threats and maintain stability.

This coordination does not mean a return to centralized control, but instead emphasizes the importance of collaborative frameworks that respect the autonomy of individual centers while promoting unified action when necessary (Keohane & Nye, 2000). Such frameworks can include joint training exercises, shared intelligence networks, and cooperative defense initiatives that leverage the strengths of each decision center while mitigating the risks of fragmentation (V. Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961). Joint training exercises, for example, can help build trust and interoperability among different defense centers, ensuring that they can work together effectively in times of crisis. Shared intelligence networks enable the rapid dissemination of critical information, allowing decision centers to respond swiftly to emerging threats. Cooperative defense initiatives can pool resources and expertise, enhancing the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the defense network.

Ukraine's current military strategy against Russia exemplifies a notable collaboration between the central government and autonomous local entities,

reflecting a sophisticated integration of state and local resources in a conflict setting. The hromada system, a key component of Ukraine's administrative structure, plays a critical role in this collaboration. Hromadas are local self-governing units with significant autonomy, empowered to manage local affairs and resources effectively. They were created as independent self-governing units as a key aspect of reform after the Maidan uprising in 2014. In the context of the ongoing conflict, these local entities have been instrumental in supporting the national military effort by organizing civilian defense initiatives, coordinating local volunteer units, and facilitating logistical support for Ukrainian forces (Keudel and Huss 2024; Keudel and Huss, n.d.). This decentralized approach enables rapid and localized responses to threats, leveraging local knowledge and resources to complement the national military strategy.

Moreover, the collaboration between state and local entities under the hromada system has been key to maintaining operational flexibility and resilience (Brik and Murtazashvili 2022). Local leaders have been able to mobilize community support, manage humanitarian and development assistance, and ensure the stability and continuity of essential services during war. Ukraine has effectively enhanced its military strategy's adaptability and effectiveness by its ability to harness the capability and autonomy of local subnational units. This cooperation underscores the importance of a collaborative framework where decentralized units can contribute meaningfully to national defense, demonstrating a model of resilience and coordination in the face of external aggression. During this time, however, key military decisions are made by national authorities in Kyiv—not by subnational units.

The role of state institutions in this context is to facilitate and coordinate, ensuring that the various decision centers can collaborate effectively while maintaining their autonomy. This approach leverages the strengths of both centralized and decentralized systems, combining the flexibility and responsiveness of local decision-making with the strategic coherence and resource pooling of centralized coordination.

5. COLLECTIVE SECURITY AS A COPRODUCED SERVICE

The analysis presented supports the view that collective security in *modus vivendi* arrangements should be seen as a *coproduced* service rather than a pure public good provided solely by a centralized state. In this context, security is the result of collaborative efforts among multiple autonomous entities, each contributing to the overall stability and resilience of the system (Chayes & Chayes, 1995).

More broadly, the concept of coproduction refers to the collaborative process in which public services are jointly produced by government agencies and

citizens or community groups. This approach emphasizes the active involvement of non-state actors in the design, delivery, and evaluation of services, aiming to leverage local knowledge, resources, and expertise to enhance service effectiveness and efficiency. Coproduction involves shared responsibilities and decision-making between public authorities and community members, fostering greater engagement and ownership (Ngo, Edelenbos, and Gianoli 2019). Theoretical foundations of coproduction suggest that involving users in service production can lead to more tailored and responsive services, improved satisfaction, and better outcomes (Ostrom, 1996).

Coproduction has been applied in various contexts, including healthcare, education, and urban planning. For example, in healthcare, patients and healthcare providers work together to manage chronic conditions through self-care programs, resulting in improved health outcomes and reduced healthcare costs. In urban planning, community-led initiatives often engage residents in designing and implementing local projects, such as neighborhood improvement plans or public space revitalizations, which enhance local relevance and community buy-in (Bovaird, 2007). These applications demonstrate the practical benefits of coproduction in enhancing public service delivery by harnessing the combined strengths of both state and non-state actors.

In practical terms, coproduced security involves the active participation of various stakeholders, including local communities, private enterprises, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in addition to state institutions and military entities. This inclusive approach ensures that security measures are comprehensive and multifaceted, addressing the full spectrum of threats and challenges that a society may face. The coproduction model acknowledges the diversity of value systems and leverages the strengths of decentralized decision-making to enhance system resilience (Sandler & Arce, 2003). By promoting a pluralistic approach to national security, *modus vivendi* arrangements can better respond to environmental shocks and maintain the institutions and norms that underpin societal well-being (Hardin, 1982).

For instance, local communities have historically been instrumental in identifying and mitigating security threats within their areas by utilizing their unique insights and local knowledge. An example of this is evident during the London Blitz in World War II, where local community wardens played a crucial role in coordinating responses to air raids, including spotting fires, organizing evacuations, and managing air-raid precautions, which supplemented broader national defense efforts (Calder, 1992). NGOs have provided essential support services, such as humanitarian aid and disaster relief, which complement the efforts of state institutions and military entities. For example, in the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, organizations like the Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières were crucial in delivering immediate healthcare,

food, and water, effectively addressing urgent needs while state and military response capacities were mobilized (Farmer, 2011).

Ukraine's current collective-security strategy reflects an evolved understanding of national defense that aligns closely with the principles of coproduction. By integrating both state and non-state actors, including local governments, volunteer organizations, and civil society, Ukraine has harnessed a broad range of resources and expertise in its defense efforts. This collaborative approach mirrors the coproduced view of national defense, where the government and local entities jointly participate in planning, executing, and adapting security measures. Local hromadas, for instance, play a crucial role in organizing civilian defense units, managing humanitarian aid, and providing logistical support to the national military. This decentralized yet coordinated effort enhances the overall effectiveness and resilience of Ukraine's defense strategy by leveraging local knowledge and mobilizing community engagement to complement the national military's capabilities, thereby building a more robust and adaptive defense network.

Coproduced defense arrangements can offer effective coordination by integrating the contributions and expertise of diverse stakeholders while mitigating the risks associated with power imbalances. In such systems, the collaborative approach ensures that decision-making processes are inclusive, allowing for the integration of local knowledge and resources into national defense strategies. By emphasizing shared responsibilities and mutual goals, these arrangements foster a sense of collective ownership and accountability, which can help to balance power dynamics. Coproduced defense arrangements facilitate ongoing communication and feedback loops among participants, which further aids in maintaining balance and coordination. Regular interactions and collaborative problem-solving ensure that all members have a voice in addressing challenges and adapting strategies. This engagement helps to identify and resolve issues arising from power imbalances before they escalate. This, in turn, fosters a more equitable and responsive defense system.

6. CONCLUSION

The analysis of *modus vivendi* approaches to pluralism here underscores the complexities and potential of this framework for managing diverse value systems in an increasingly interconnected world. While *modus vivendi* approaches offer a pragmatic approach to coexistence by prioritizing stability and compromise over uniformity, their resilience remains a central concern. The absence of centralized control in these pluralistic systems often leads to coordination challenges and sometimes weakened collective responses. These cases highlight the vulnerabilities inherent in decentralized arrangements and

the critical need for effective coordination mechanisms to maintain the durability of *modus vivendi* approaches.

The chapter identifies pathways through which *modus vivendi* arrangements can enhance resilience of governance systems, particularly through the adoption of polycentric defense structures. By distributing military capacity across multiple decision centers, these systems can reduce the risks of rent-seeking behavior and improve adaptability in the face of environmental shocks. Furthermore, viewing collective security as a coproduced service, involving a wide range of stakeholders—from state institutions to local communities and private enterprises—offers a promising model for achieving resilience in *modus vivendi* systems. This approach not only addresses the challenges of power imbalances but also fosters greater ownership and accountability across all levels of governance. The Ukrainian collective security strategy, which effectively integrates state and local resources, serves as a contemporary example of how coproduced defense arrangements can successfully enhance national defense capabilities.

While this chapter primarily focused on the dynamics of violent physical conflict and corresponding investments in military capacity, the analytical framework presented here can also be extended to security threats emerging from non-physical forms of conflict. These include social tensions, political disputes, and cyber threats, all of which pose significant risks to the stability and cohesion of systems that adopt *modus vivendi* characteristics. Just as decentralized jurisdictions allocate resources between productive tasks and military defense, they must also navigate strategic decisions to manage and mitigate these non-physical conflicts effectively. Polycentric approaches may be instrumental in addressing such challenges, as they enable rapid and context-specific responses that are critical in digital and political domains. For this reason, the application of a *modus vivendi* approach in governance almost requires the adoption of polycentric principles of governance.

There are important boundaries and scope conditions for the application of coproduced defense. Should coproduced defense rely on formal organizations that explicitly coordinate activities, or could it be more effective to establish rules and norms that guide the actions of stakeholders? This question has significant implications for the coordination, flexibility, and resilience of coproduced defense systems within *modus vivendi* frameworks.

Formal organizations tasked with coordinating coproduced defense could provide clear structures for decision-making, resource allocation, and accountability. These organizations would, thus, have the authority to enforce agreements, manage conflicts, and ensure that all participants are aligned with the overarching security goals. The creation of such organizations, however, might result in the centralization of political power, potentially affecting the autonomy and local responsiveness that coproduction seeks to foster. On the other

hand, a system based on shared rules and norms could promote flexibility and adaptability by allowing local entities to maintain independence while contributing to collective security efforts. Such an approach could empower local decision-makers to respond quickly to emerging threats, though it may also present challenges in terms of achieving consistent implementation and unified action when necessary. The balance between these approaches remains a critical area for future research.

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